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Anticipated versus inferred politeness
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Abstract
A number of researchers have recently argued that politeness is not always
inferred in the form of an implicature as claimed by Brown and Levinson
(1987), but rather can be anticipated by addressees when it involves ex-
pected behaviour. The distinction between anticipated and inferred polite-
ness is thus an important area for further development of politeness theory.
In this paper, the way in which the notion of ‘expectations’ is related to
politeness is first considered, before outlining the distinction between antici-
pated and inferred politeness in some detail. It is then argued that discourse
politeness theory (Usami, 1998, 2001a, b, 2002) shows greater promise for
deepening our understanding of this distinction than the proposals made
thus far by relevance theorists. It is concluded that any investigation of the
distinction between anticipating and inferring politeness must ultimately be
grounded in empirical studies of politeness phenomena.
Politeness has been the subject of an enormous amount of research in
the past twenty years, but it has also generated considerable controversy.
Brown and Levinson’s (1987) face-saving view of politeness in particular
has stimulated a prolific amount of discussion. Various aspects of Brown
and Levinson’s theory have received attention, but in recent times their
claim that politeness is something that is communicated by means of an
implicature has come under scrutiny. Brown and Levinson assume that
for politeness to arise in interaction, a ‘polite intention’ must be attrib-
uted to the speaker by the addressee (Brown 1995: 169; 2001: 11623;
Brown and Levinson 1987: 95). This attribution by inference to the
speaker of an intention to be polite constitutes a (particularised) implica-
ture:
Polite utterances are not necessarily communicating ‘real’ feelings
about another’s social persona, but expressing contextually-expected
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concern for face. This concern is an ‘implicature’, an inference of polite
intentions, not a feature inextricably attached to particular linguistic
forms. (Brown 2001: 11623, author’s original emphasis)
A number of researchers, however, have argued that this assumption is
counter-intuitive. They argue that politeness is generally not inferred as
an implicature, as it is usually expected by interactants, and thus is not
noticed (Escandell-Vidal 1998; Jary 1998a; Fraser 1990, 1999; Matsui
2001; Terkourafi 2001a, 2001b; Zegarac 1998). This kind of politeness is
termed ‘anticipated politeness’ by Fraser (1999), in order to contrast it
with Brown and Levinson’s view of politeness as inferred. While a
number of researchers argue that politeness is only anticipated and thus
is never inferred (Escandell-Vidal 1998; Fraser 1999),1 others have as-
sumed that although politeness is primarily anticipated, it may also be
inferred in the form of an implicature (Jary 1998a: 67; Matsui 2001:
52; Terkourafi 2001a: 179, 2001b: 120127; Zegarac 1998: 353354). In
other words, there are two main ways in which politeness is communi-
cated: it may be anticipated or it may be inferred.
In this paper, the way in which politeness arises relative to situation-
specific social norms is first discussed to illustrate how the expectations
that underlie anticipated and inferred politeness are distinct from adher-
ence to social norms or conventions. The distinction between anticipated
and inferred politeness is then considered in more detail in the second
section, contrasting it with other distinctions that have been drawn in
politeness theory. In the third section, it is briefly argued that relevance
theoretic explanations of politeness do not provide a solid basis for fur-
thering our understanding of the notions of anticipated and inferred
politeness. In the final section it is suggested that discourse politeness
theory (Usami 1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) has greater potential for future
investigation of this important distinction in politeness theory.
1. Politeness and social norms2
Politeness involves people showing they think well of others or showing
they don’t think more highly of themselves than they should. In Japa-
nese, for example, this may involve showing one respects the social posi-
tion of others (or that one does not respect one’s own social position too
much). In English, on the other hand, it may involve showing that one
respects the right of others to be free from imposition (or that one does
not think too highly of one’s own right to be free from imposition).
What constitutes showing that one thinks well of others (or at least
showing that one does not think badly of others), and showing that one
does not think more highly of oneself than one should, involves a
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number of aspects that vary across different cultures. In other words,
politeness is a culture-sensitive phenomenon (Mursy and Wilson 2001;
Janney and Arndt 1993; Lee-Wong 2002; Nwoye 1989).
On the basis of utterances which show a speaker thinks well of others
(or at least not badly of others), addressees form perceptions of how
others evaluate them. And addressees also form perceptions of how oth-
ers evaluate themselves, on the basis of utterances which show a speaker
does not think more highly of him/herself than he should. When the
addressee’s perceptions lie within the thresholds of appropriateness as
dictated by social norms (Eelen 2001; Selnick 2002), various types of
politeness arise. These social norms vary according to the situation and
also across individuals. In other words, politeness is situation-sensitive
(Matsumoto 1989; Pan 2000), and perceptions of it vary across native
speakers of a language (Eelen 2001).
For example, politeness may arise in (New Zealand) English upon
receiving an invitation to lunch from a colleague in a university depart-
ment. This colleague, whom I have only just met, shows he approves of
me through this invitation. On the basis of his invitation, I may form
the perception that my colleague approves of me, and since this degree
of approval lies within the range of what might be expected according
to social norms in this situation, politeness arises.
People are also concerned about what one shows one thinks of oneself
in front of others, and this concern for what we show we think of our-
selves is related to evaluations of politeness. For example, in (New
Zealand) English if someone praises my work at a departmental meeting,
I may respond to this compliment by saying that much of the work was
due to another colleague with whom I collaborated. By highlighting the
contribution of my colleague I show that I do not think too highly of
my ability as a researcher. If on the basis of my response to the compli-
ment, the other person thinks that I do not think too highly of myself,
politeness may arise, because being modest about one’s work lies within
the range of what is expected according to the norms of that kind of
situation.
Politeness thus always arises relative to some kind of situation-specific
social norms. These norms are essentially expectations about what peo-
ple should show they think of others, or what people should show they
think of themselves. In other words, these social norms are expectations
in the sense of thinking something is necessary. In this way, whether a
particular behaviour is regarded as polite or not, depends on its percep-
tion relative to what one thinks is necessary for people to show they
think of someone else, or think of themselves. If one thinks that ‘what a
person shows they think of others’ is the same or better than ‘what they
should show they think of others’, politeness arises. And if one thinks
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that ‘what a person shows they think of themselves’ is the same or worse
than ‘what they should show they think of themselves, politeness also
arises. Naturally, there is some variation across speakers as to what they
think is necessary to show one thinks of others and oneself, but if polite-
ness is to arise (as opposed to dispute about politeness), there must be
some consensus about the social norms for that particular situation.
However, there is also another kind of expectation that influences the
way in which politeness arises. While expectations may involve thinking
something is necessary (to occur), they may also involve thinking some-
thing is likely to occur. In other words, expectations as estimations of the
probability that a particular behaviour will occur. It is expectation in
this second sense that is fundamental to the way in which politeness is
communicated: whether it is anticipated or it is inferred.
2. The distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness
The distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness is predicated
on the notion of expectation as an estimation of the probability that a
certain behaviour will occur. In other words, what the addressee thinks
the speaker will most likely show the speaker thinks of the addressee (or
what the addressee thinks the speaker will most likely show the speaker
thinks of the speaker). If we expect a certain behaviour to occur that
does indeed occur, and this behaviour gives rise to politeness, then po-
liteness is anticipated. On the other hand, if we are not expecting a cer-
tain behaviour to occur which nevertheless does occur, and this behavi-
our gives rise to politeness, then this politeness must be inferred. In
other words, politeness is anticipated when the behaviour giving rise to
politeness is expected, while it is inferred when the behaviour giving rise
to politeness is not expected.
Politeness which is anticipated arises, and thus is unnoticed, when the
linguistic form or pragmatic strategy is conventionally used in a particu-
lar situation (Terkourafi 2001a: 179, 2001b: 120127; Zegarac 1998:
353). In other words, we expect that someone will show they think well
of others, or do not think more highly of themselves than they should
(thereby giving rise to politeness), because this particular linguistic form
or strategy is commonly used in that kind of situation.
In example (1), the utterance is conventionalised in (British) English
for conveying a request such as (2).
(1) (John is a guest addressing his host at during a dinner party at the
latter’s house)
John: I was wondering if it is OK to open some windows?
(2) The speaker wants some windows opened. (Terkourafi 2001a: 179)
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Terkourafi claims that politeness is a part of the conventional meaning
of the utterance in (1) in this context.3
Based on his/her prior experience in similar communicative situations,
s/he will already hold a belief that, roughly, ‘uttering (something like)
(1) when one is a guest at another’s house and one wishes to perform
‘something like) the request in (2) in English is polite’. Based on this
belief, upon the speaker’s uttering (1) in this situation, the addressee
will form the further belief that the speaker is polite. Since politeness
as a perlocutionary effect consists in the addressee holding this further
belief, politeness will now have been achieved without the recognition
of whatever intention the speaker may have had. That is, it will have
now been not implicated, but anticipated: requiring no inferencing to
be achieved, it passes unnoticed. (Terkourafi 2001a: 180)
In another example of anticipated politeness, when meeting colleagues
at the department in which I work, it is normal to greet each other in a
formulaic sequence such as illustrated in example (3).
(3) Jane: Hi, how are you?
Bill: I’m fine, how are you?
Jane: Good thanks.
Since the main function of Jane’s first utterance is not really to inquire
about the hearer’s well-being as such, but rather to simply show Jane’s
willingness to engage in social interaction with Bill, it is an example of
phatic communication, which also gives rise to politeness.4 The polite-
ness arising from this utterance, however, is generally not noticed. In
fact, it is only noticed in its absence, because Bill expects that Jane will
say something like this. That is to say, if Jane does not say Hi, how are
you? when bumping into Bill, although it might simply be interpreted as
tiredness on Jane’s part, it could also be interpreted as a lack of concern
for him, which could give rise to perceptions of impoliteness. The polite-
ness that arises in this kind of example is thus anticipated, because Bill
expects Jane will show she is willing to engage in social interaction with
him by saying something like Hi, how are you?
Politeness is inferred (by means of an implicature) ‘when the expres-
sion used by the speaker is not conventionalised for some use’ (Terkou-
rafi 2001a: 175). Terkourafi (2001a) argues that in (British) English the
utterance in example (4) gives rise to the implicature that the speaker is
being polite in the process of drawing the (particularised) implicature
that the speaker wants the hearer to make it ‘not-hot’ for the speaker.5
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(4) (A is a guest addressing his host during a dinner party at the latter’s
house)
A: It’s hot in here.
Implies: The speaker is being polite [in uttering (4)]
Implies: The speaker wants me to somehow make it ‘not-hot’ for
him/her.
(Terkourafi 2001a: 177)
In this example, politeness is not anticipated, because the hearer does
not necessarily expect that speaker will show that he thinks well of him
or her by implying a request in this manner, so it must therefore be in-
ferred.
Examples of inferred politeness can also be found in Japanese. In
example (5) the speaker’s intention to be polite is inferred directly from
what the teacher says.
(5) (A teacher says to a student …)
Teacher: Kono
this
eibun
English
essei,
essay,
naiyoo
contents
totemo
very
ii
good
kara,
so,
ato
afterwards
wa
Topic
bunpoo
grammar
to
and
tsuzuri
spelling
no
of
mondai
problem
dake
only
ne.
Mood
(‘The contents of this English essay are very good, so after-
wards [there is] just the issue of grammar and spelling …’)
(Matsui 2001: 54)
The meaning of the first clause of the teacher’s utterance (kono eibun
essei, naiyoo totemo ii) directly expresses approval or encouragement of
the hearer (that is, the teacher shows he or she thinks well of the stu-
dent). The fact that the teacher shows she thinks well of her student is
inferred by the student rather than being anticipated, because this kind
of utterance is not conventionally used to show approval of someone
(thereby giving rise to politeness).
In further example in Japanese, Mari indirectly refuses Yoko’s invita-
tion to go to karaoke by giving a reason why she can’t go, thereby
implicating politeness.
(6) Yoko: Osoku
late
na-tta
become-Past
kedo,
but,
karaoke
karaoke
yotte
drop in
(i)ka-nai?
go-Negative?
(‘It’s late, but do you want to go to karaoke?’)
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Mari: Ashita
tomorrow
hachi-ji
eight o’clock
ni
at
juuyoona
important
kaigi
meeting
ga
Nominative
hai-tte-iru
enter-Te-State
no.
Nominaliser
(‘I have an important meeting tomorrow at eight o’clock’)
Yoko: Waka-tta.
understand-Past.
Ja
Well
mata
again
kondo
next time
to
Quote
iu
say
koto
thing
de.
with
(‘Okay. Well next time then’) (Matsui 2001: 56)
The politeness which arises in this example consists of assumptions such
as Mari wa riyuu o nobete teinei ni sasoi o kotowatteiru (‘Mari gave a
reason and refused the invitation politely’), and Teinei ni kotowatteiru to
iu koto wa shoorai tsugoo ga tsukeba issho ni karaoke ni itte mo ii to iu
koto da (‘Refusing politely indicates that when it is more convenient in
the future, [Mari] may go together with me to karaoke’) (Matsui 2001:
57). In other words, Mari shows that she does not think badly of Yoko
in spite of refusing Yoko’s invitation. The politeness that arises is inferred
rather than being anticipated, because this implicature is not convention-
alised for showing one does not think badly of someone else.
There are a number of other distinctions that have been previously
drawn in politeness theory that might appear to be related to the distinc-
tion between anticipated and inferred politeness. In particular, Watts’
(1989, 1992) notion of ‘politic behaviour’ which encompasses polite be-
haviour, Ide’s (1989) notions of ‘discernment politeness’ and ‘volitional
politeness’, and Lee-Wong’s (2000) notions of ‘normative politeness’ and
‘strategic politeness’. However, the focus of these concepts differs from
that highlighted in the distinction between anticipated and inferred po-
liteness.
Watts (1989, 1992) suggests that politeness should be viewed in the
wider context of ‘politic behaviour’. The former is defined as marked
behaviour that leads to an enhancement of one’s standing with respect
to others (that is, making other people have a better opinion of oneself)
(Watts 1992: 51), while the latter is defined as behaviour which estab-
lishes or maintains the state of equilibrium of personal relationships
(Watts 1992: 50). Watts’ view of politeness, however, diverges somewhat
from the distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness. Firstly,
whether politeness is anticipated or inferred, the nature of what is com-
municated does not change. Both anticipated and inferred politeness in-
volve showing that one thinks well of others, or not more highly of
oneself than one should. Polite and politic behaviour, on the other hand,
often involve communicating distinct kinds of interpersonal implica-
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tions. Secondly, anticipated politeness does not encompass or overlap
with inferred politeness. Politeness is either anticipated or it is inferred,
while in Watts’ view politeness is one species of politic behaviour, or at
least overlaps with it.
The notions of discernment and volitional politeness (Ide 1989), or the
analogous notions of normative and strategic politeness (Lee-Wong
2000), are closer in nature to the concepts of anticipated and inferred
politeness. Discernment politeness involves speakers following social
norms or conventions, while volitional politeness involves the intentional
use by speakers of strategies to communicate politeness (Ide 1989:
230231).
However, there are at least two main differences between discernment/
normative and volitional/strategic politeness, and anticipated and in-
ferred politeness. First of all, whether politeness is anticipated or in-
ferred, it still involves evaluations of what a person shows they think of
someone else (or themselves) relative to what people should show they
think of others or themselves. In other words, politeness always arises
relative to social norms. Both anticipated and inferred politeness involve
behaviour that falls within the appropriate range of behaviour as dic-
tated by social norms. Secondly, anticipated and inferred politeness are
firmly situated in the hearer’s view of the interaction, while discernment/
normative and volitional/strategic politeness are framed in terms of the
speaker’s perspective. Whether politeness is anticipated or inferred de-
pends primarily on what the hearer expects the speaker will show he
thinks of someone else or him/herself.
The distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness constitutes
an important part of the relevance theoretic approach to politeness. Rel-
evance theorists have argued that the ‘principle of relevance’ can be used
to make this distinction. In the following section it is argued, however,
that the notion of cognitive effects, which is central to the principle of
relevance, needs to be more adequately characterised in relation to po-
liteness if it is to provide a solid theoretical foundation for further devel-
opments of this important distinction.
3. Relevance theory and anticipated versus inferred politeness
Relevance theory is essentially a theory of utterance comprehension from
the perspective of the hearer. Its core claim is that all communication is
constrained by the ‘principle of relevance’. The principle of relevance, or
more specifically the communicative principle of relevance, states that
‘every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of
its own optimal relevance’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 260), where rele-
vance is defined as a balance between (positive) cognitive effects and
processing effort (1995: 265266).
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Relevance theory has been criticised as an inherently asocial pragmatic
theory (Mey and Talbot 1988), but others have countered that relevance
theory can accommodate social aspects of communication (Jucker 1988;
Coupland and Jaworski 1997; Sperber and Wilson 1997). A number of
studies have attempted to apply relevance theory to the study of polite-
ness (Escandell-Vidal 1996, 1998; Jary 1998a, 1998b; Matsui 2001; Zega-
rac 1998, 2000), retaining Brown and Levinson’s notion of ‘face’ as part
of their explanations of politeness phenomena.
As was noted previously, a number of relevance theorists have argued
that generally politeness is not intended to be communicated by
interlocutors (that is, it is not inferred as Brown and Levinson claim),
but rather is a matter of ‘social adequacy’ or conforming to a set of
cultural norms (Escandell-Vidal 1996, 1998; Jary 1998a; Zegarac 1998).
In other words, the cognitive effects arising from the use of many so-
called ‘polite forms’ (such as Can you pass the salt?) are not relevant
enough to be noticed by hearers, because they only confirm what hearers
already think the speaker thinks of them, and consequently are not com-
municated.
When I say to you: Do you mind if I open the window? I am certainly
using a polite form. But am I communicating some polite assump-
tions? Hardly, provided you assume that I am generally a polite per-
son. True, my utterance does provide evidence of my being polite, but
you would not be justified in assuming that I intended it to be relevant
in this way. An utterance can hardly be expected to be relevant to the
hearer merely by virtue of confirming belief assumptions which are al-
ready held at maximal strength. (Zegarac 1998: 353, my emphasis)
Under this view, politeness is not inferred, because it arises from
following social norms; and nothing is inferred through the adherence
to these social norms if the interlocutors involved usually follow these
social norms (just as nothing in particular is inferred from producing
grammatical utterances in most situations). In other words, the interper-
sonal cognitive effects arising from this kind of utterance are not suffi-
ciently great to outweigh the processing costs involved, so they are not
relevant enough to be inferred.
The relevance theoretic approach to politeness has been applied in
examining honorifics and other related politeness phenomena in Japan-
ese. Honorifics (sonkeigo and kenjoogo; ‘subject’ and ‘object’ honorifics),
speech levels (keitai and jootai; ‘polite forms’ and ‘non-polite forms’),
and personal pronouns, which are often used according to social norms,
are termed ‘politeness indicators’ by Matsui (2001: 55). She argues that
politeness is not inferred as part of an explicature in the case of polite-
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ness indicators, as they do not contribute to the truth-conditional
content of utterances.6 For example, there is no difference in the truth-
conditions of Sensei ga kita (‘the teacher came’) and Sensei ga irasshai-
mashita (‘the teacher came-Honorific’). She goes on to argue that polite-
ness indicators do not explicate or implicate politeness at all. Since their
use is based on the interlocutor’s mutual cognitive environment (that is,
they are used according to social norms), their occurrence does not have
any effect on the hearer’s cognitive environment. Instead, they lower
processing effort, and thereby facilitate communication.
In drawing the distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness,
relevance theorists claim that politeness can only be inferred when the
assumption of politeness is ‘relevant’ enough. Whether an assumption is
‘relevant’ enough to be inferred depends on whether or not it has suffi-
ciently large cognitive effects relative to processing effort. However, the
problem facing the relevance theoretic account of the distinction between
anticipated and inferred politeness is that neither cognitive effects nor
processing effort (the two key components of Sperber and Wilson’s tech-
nical notion of relevance) have been sufficiently characterised in relation
to politeness. In particular, there is no distinction made between cogni-
tive effects which have ‘positive affect’ (such as feelings of approval or
warmth and so on), and those which have ‘negative affect’ (such as an-
tagonism or alienation and so on). For example, there is no distinction
made between showing that one thinks well of others (which can give
rise to politeness), and showing that one thinks badly of others (which
can give rise to impoliteness).
Kuiper (1997) attempts to develop further develop the relevance
theoretic notion of cognitive effects in relation to politeness in his pro-
posals on ‘face’. He conceptualises face as calibrations of basic assump-
tions about social selves created through interactions with others. The
assumptions with which face are calibrated are ‘everyone loves me’
through to ‘everybody hates me’ (positive face), and ‘I can do something’
through to ‘I can’t do anything’ (negative face). However, these assump-
tions, while heading in the right direction, are too simplistic to capture
the complexities of the assumptions about social selves underlying polite-
ness. For example, showing that one thinks well of others (which can
give rise to politeness), involves more than just showing one approves of
someone else (Kuiper’s notion of positive face), or showing one thinks
someone else is quite competent (Kuiper’s notion of negative face). It
can also involve recognition of someone else’s social position, or respect-
ing the right of others to be free from imposition.
The notion of cognitive effects which underlies the principle of rele-
vance has not been sufficiently characterised in relation to politeness. It
is thus difficult to see how the principle of relevance can be useful in
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furthering our understanding of the distinction between anticipated and
inferred politeness. While relevance theorists have tried to refute the
claim that relevance theory is essentially asocial, to date it has not pro-
vided a solid foundation upon which to theorise about social phenomena
such as politeness.
However, there are alternative frameworks in which to examine the
distinction between anticipated and inferred politeness. In the following
section, the potential of discourse politeness theory for further investiga-
tion of this distinction is discussed.
4. Discourse politeness theory and anticipated versus inferred politeness
The importance of examining politeness not only at the utterance level,
but also at the discourse level, has been emphasised by Usami, who is
developing a discourse theory of politeness (1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2002).
The two key proposals in discourse politeness theory are the interdepen-
dent notions of ‘discourse politeness’ and ‘unmarked politeness’.
The notion of discourse politeness is an attempt by Usami to integrate
discourse level phenomena into politeness theory. Discourse politeness
is defined by Usami (2001a) as follows:
Discourse politeness is the functional dynamic as a whole of factors
(including factors at the level of utterances) giving rise to ‘pragmatic
politeness’, which cannot be observed at the level of single utterances,
but rather only in longer stretches of discourse. (2001a: 11)7
In other words, discourse politeness is the ‘contribution of the discourse
as a whole towards the regulation of politeness’ (2001a: 9).
Usami goes on to suggest that discourse politeness is primarily realised
as ‘unmarked politeness’ in conversations. Unmarked politeness is essen-
tially synonymous with the notion of anticipated politeness. Unmarked
politeness is defined as follows:
It is a type (of politeness) where certain language behaviour is uncon-
sciously expected, and when it does not occur as expected and one
becomes conscious of this, the utterance or discourse is taken to be
impolite. In other words, it refers to neither particularly (marked) po-
lite utterances, nor to impolite utterances, but rather refers to the state
of the discourse as a whole. I term utterances contributing to the dis-
course as a whole which are not impolite and satisfy what is implicitly
expected to occur according to each specific situation, ‘unmarked be-
haviour’. ‘Unmarked behaviour’ becomes ‘unmarked politeness’ when
politeness is involved. (2001a: 12)
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For discourse politeness in each specific context there are ‘defaults’, both
for discourse politeness as a whole, and for the individual factors which
constitute discourse politeness, and these represent unmarked politeness
in that conversation. On the other hand, linguistic behaviour which devi-
ates from these defaults and shows concern for the interlocutor is termed
‘marked politeness’. Marked politeness is equated with Brown and Lev-
inson’s implicated politeness by Usami (2001a: 11).
Usami (2001a, b) discusses the use of ‘speech levels’ in Japanese to
illustrate the contrast between unmarked and marked politeness.8 She
claims that the unmarked speech level for utterance-endings in conversa-
tions between people meeting for the first time is the ‘polite form’ (P),
while the unmarked speech level for conversations between friends or
housewives is the ‘non-polite form’ (N). The ‘polite form’ (keitai) is
essentially the desu/masu form (e.g. ikimasu, ‘to go’), while the ‘non-
polite form’ (jootai) is the plain or dictionary form (e.g. iku, ‘to go’).
These respective forms are unmarked when they are used more than 50
percent of the time in conversations, and constitute the unmarked dis-
course politeness defaults in their respective contexts. Thus in conversa-
tions between people meeting for the first time, the ‘non-polite form’
constitutes marked behaviour, while in conversations between house-
wives or friends, the ‘polite form’ represents marked behaviour.
There are three types of effects marked behaviour can give rise to:
(1) ‘marked politeness’ (for example, the use of ‘non-polite forms’ in
conversations between people meeting for the first time may show
familiarity or closeness (that is, show the speaker approves of the
addressee), while the use of ‘polite forms’ in conversations between
friends may show the speaker’s reluctance to impinge on the hearer
(that is, show the speaker respects the addressee);
(2) ‘linguistic discourse effects’ (for example, emphasising propositional
content or topic changes);
(3) ‘minus politeness’ (that is, impoliteness or sarcasm).
In order to identify marked politeness (and other effects such as impo-
liteness), it is therefore necessary to first establish what constitutes un-
marked politeness in a particular conversation (Usami 2001a: 45).
Usami (2002) reports from her analysis of 72 conversations between
unacquainted Japanese adults, that 60 percent of utterance endings were
the ‘polite form’, 10 percent were the ‘non-polite form’, and 30 percent
had no ‘politeness marker’ at all. The default ratio for speech levels in
this context is therefore: ‘polite form’ 6: ‘non-polite form’ 1: no marker
3. The default speech level for conversations between unacquainted
adults can thus be identified as the ‘polite form’. In other words, the
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polite form constitutes ‘unmarked politeness’ in this context, and thus
‘non-polite forms’, in particular, are a form of marked behaviour (Usami
2001a: 3233).9 Depending on the content and context of the utterance,
this marked behaviour may give rise to ‘marked politeness’, impoliteness,
or some kind of discourse effect such as marking a change in topic.
Determining discourse politeness defaults, which are fundamental for
an analysis of unmarked and marked politeness in conversations, re-
quires careful empirical analysis of conversations involving the element
in question. These defaults vary not only for each element of discourse
politeness (such as frequency of backchannels, frequency of topic intro-
duction, utterance sequence patterns and so on), but may even vary for
the same element within a single conversation. For example, in conversa-
tions between younger Japanese, it has been shown that while the ‘polite
form’ is most common at the beginning of conversations, as time passes
and the interlocutors become more comfortable with each other, the pro-
portion of ‘non-polite forms’ increases (Usami 2001a: 3334). Discourse
politeness defaults may be different for speech levels depending on which
part of the conversation is observed (that is, the beginning versus the
end of the conversation), and thus what constitutes marked behaviour
and what effects this marked behaviour gives rise to may also be dif-
ferent.
Discourse politeness defaults for honorifics have been established in
Korean and Japanese by Kim (2000), who examined twelve conversa-
tions (six for each language) between unacquainted people in their twen-
ties. Kim found that 30 percent of utterances contained ‘super-polite
forms’ (that is, subject and object honorifics) in Korean, while only 10
percent of utterances contained ‘super-polite forms’ in Japanese. Thus
politeness (or some other kind of effect) may be inferred in Korean if
more than 30 percent of utterances in a conversation contain super-
polite forms, while in Japanese conversations politeness may be inferred
if only more than 10 percent of utterances contain super-polite forms.
Another example of discourse politeness defaults is that found by Xie
(2001) in her study of utterance sequence patterns of requests in Chinese
and Japanese. Her analysis of 120 conversations (60 for each language),
which all involved a request to borrow some notes and handouts from
a previous class at university from a close friend, showed a clear differ-
ence in the discourse politeness defaults for request utterance sequences.
In Japanese, the discourse politeness default sequence was found to be
an attention-getter (such as ‘excuse me’ or calling out the addressee’s
name), followed by checking potential for compliance, and then support-
ive moves (such as giving reasons for the request), before the request
utterance itself. In Chinese, however, the discourse politeness default
sequence was found to involve only an attention-getter followed by the
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request utterance. Thus in Chinese, the use of supportive moves in mak-
ing a request would constitute marked behaviour in this context. Al-
though it could be interpreted as a form of marked politeness (that is,
showing one respects the addressee), it is more likely to be interpreted
as expressing social distance and unfriendliness (Xie 2001: 98).
4. Conclusion
The notion of anticipated politeness is firmly grounded in our expecta-
tions of how people will interact with others. Politeness is anticipated
when we think someone will say or do something that shows they think
well of us (or do not think more highly of themselves than they should),
and that person does as we expect. In contrast, politeness is inferred
when we do not think someone will say or do something that shows they
think well of us (or do not think more highly of themselves than they
should), yet that person still does it contrary to our expectations.
Whether anticipated politeness should be regarded as more important or
prevalent than inferred politeness is still to be resolved, but whatever the
result of that debate, it is clear that the existence of this distinction
counters Brown and Levinson’s claim that politeness is always inferred
as an implicature.
Relevance theorists have been instrumental in bringing the notion of
anticipated politeness to the fore. However, relevance theory does not
provide a solid foundation upon which to investigate this distinction,
because cognitive effects (which are a key component of the notion of
relevance) are not sufficiently characterised in relation to politeness.
Discourse politeness theory, on the other hand, constitutes a more
useful basis for investigating the distinction between anticipated and in-
ferred politeness. It shows that one way in which to investigate this dis-
tinction is to determine the defaults for different elements of conversa-
tion (such as speech levels or utterance sequence patterns), through care-
ful analysis of the use of these elements in particular contexts across
samples of speech by speakers of the language in question.
While our intuitions provide a starting point for the investigation of
the expectations underlying anticipated and inferred politeness, careful
analysis of the behaviour of a reasonable sample of speakers is also
required to determine what behaviour we might expect in different situa-
tions. Empirical analysis to determine defaults also avoids the possibility
of unwarranted distortion arising from the researcher’s own individual
perceptions and intuitions about these defaults. There thus remains
much work yet to be done in the field of politeness research.
The University of Queensland
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Notes
1. Fraser (1999), for example, claims that politeness is only ever anticipated as a perlo-
cutionary effect and is never communicated: ‘Politeness is not communicated, it is
not an implicature, and the absence of communicated politeness should not be
taken as a lack of polite attitude … in any normal conversation, politeness is the
expected state of affairs, where what constitutes politeness is dictated by the rele-
vant socio-cultural norm for that interaction. Participants note not when someone
is being polite but rather when the speaker is violating this norm. On this view,
politeness is not communicated but is a type of perlocutionary effect.’
2. The view of politeness outlined in this section is based on the approach proposed
by Haugh and Hinze (2003).
3. In a different context this utterance will be interpreted differently (e. g. between a
husband and wife at home), and politeness will not be anticipated.
4. Phatic communication is a term coined by Malinowski (1923), and involves utter-
ances ‘whose main implicit import has to do with the speaker’s disposition towards
establishing and/or maintaining a social relationship with the hearer’ (Zegarac
1998: 330), and where the fact that an utterance has been made is often of more
importance than the content of the utterance itself.
5. In other languages, this type of implied request may not give rise to politeness,
since politeness is culture-sensitive (as noted in the previous section).
6. An explicature is defined as ‘a propositional form communicated by an utterance
which is pragmatically constructed on the basis of the propositional schema or
template (logical form) that the utterance encodes; its content is an amalgam of
linguistically decoded material and pragmatically inferred material’ (Carston 2000:
10), while an implicature is defined as any other propositional form communicated
by an utterance; its content consists of wholly pragmatically inferred matter (Cars-
ton 2000: 10; Sperber and Wilson 1995: 182). Problems with the relevance theoretic
notions of explicature and implicature are discussed further in Haugh (2002).
7. Pragmatic politeness refers to ‘language behaviour that functions to establish and
maintain smooth interpersonal relationships’ (Usami 2001a: 10) (author’s own
translation).
8. In Japanese there are two basic speech levels in terms of utterance-endings, the
‘polite form’ and the ‘non-polite form’.
9. Non-marking of speech level may also give rise to particular effects, such as express-
ing closeness by avoiding ‘marking’ social distance with ‘polite forms’.
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